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1.  Introduction 
The tax avoidance phenomenon is an issue that is 
widely discussed in various countries. The condition 
is marked by the emergence of significant figures in 
the ‘Panama paper’ case and various global 
companies, including Apple, Gucci, and Google 
(Davis et al., 2015). In Indonesia, one of the 
multinational cigarette companies is suspect’d of tax 
evasion through PT. Bentoel International Investama  
(Kontan, 2019). Moreover, tax avoidance practice 
leads to fraud (corruption) that involves tax officials' 
bribery (CNN Indonesia.com, 2016). As a result, tax 
avoidance practices focus on academics (Huseynov 
et al., 2017; Mahaputra et al., 2018) and invite public 
and mass media attention (Kanagaretnam et al., 
2016). Based on this phenomenon, empirical studies 
on tax avoidance need to be explored. 
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This study aims to examine the relationship between political connection and tax avoidance 
and the role of ownership structure as a moderating variable. Corporate tax avoidance is 
calculated using effective tax rate (ETR). The research population is manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2017 to 2019. Using purposive 
method this study gathered data from 119 companies or 357 company-year observations. 
This study revealed that political connection has a negative effect on ETR. This finding 
indicates that the political connections may lead to nepotism practices with aim to reduce the 
corporate tax burden. The managerial ownership strengthens the negative relationship 
between political connection and ETR. However, institutional ownership weakens the 
negative relationship between political connection and ETR. Contrary to these two results, 
public ownership cannot moderate the political connection and ETR. 
 
Koneksi dewan direksi dan penghindaran pajak: struktur kepemilikan 
sebagai variabel moderasi 
 
ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji hubungan antara koneksi politik dan penghindaran 
pajak dan peran struktur kepemilikan sebagai variabel pemoderasi. Penghindaran pajak 
perusahaan dihitung dengan menggunakan effective tax rate (ETR). Nilai ETR yang lebih 
rendah menunjukkan tingkat penghindaran pajak yang lebih tinggi. Populasi penelitian 
adalah perusahaan manufaktur di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2017 s.d. 2019. Penelitian ini 
menggunakan metode purposive sampling untuk mendapatkan 119 sampel atau 357 data 
selama tiga tahun pengamatan. Hasil penelitian membuktikan bahwa hubungan politik 
berpengaruh negatif terhadap ETR. Temuan ini menunjukkan bahwa koneksi politik 
mengarah pada upaya nepotisme dengan maksud mengurangi beban pajak perusahaan. 
Kepemilikan manajerial memperkuat hubungan negatif antara hubungan politik dan ETR. 
Namun, kepemilikan institusional melemahkan hubungan negatif antara koneksi politik dan 
ETR. Bertentangan dengan kedua hasil ini, kepemilikan publik tidak dapat memoderasi 
hubungan politik dan ETR. 
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Tax avoidance practice is a complex 
phenomenon because it involves internal and 
external parties of the company. The company board 
determines tax management strategy from an 
internal perspective, both the board of directors and 
commissioners (Wahab et al., 2021). Based on an 
external perspective, tax management involves 
external parties such as institutional and community 
shareholders. Thus, politically connected company 
boards are an essential predictor in the choice of tax 
management strategies (Barford & Holt, 2013). 
Meanwhile, the ownership structure plays a role in 
aligning management and various stakeholders' 
interests, mainly regarding saving corporate tax 
payments (Kovermann & Velte, 2019). 
This research contributes to filling four research 
gaps. First, the Directorate General of Taxes reports 
that the manufacturing industry is the highest income 
tax payer in Indonesia. It shows the existence of 
corporate taxpayer compliance (Kemenperin.go.id, 
2018). However, several empirical findings indicate 
tax avoidance practices in public companies. The 
previous results by Mustika et al. (2018) reveal that 
the average cash effective tax rate is lower than the 
statutory tax rate. Other studies also prove that tax 
payments are lower than the corporate tax rate 
implemented in Indonesia (Mappadang et al., 2018; 
Putra et al., 2019; Tanujaya & Valentine, 2020). This 
finding supports the phenomenon that shows many 
companies seeks to avoid taxes by reporting losses 
continuously, one of which is the manufacturing 
industry (Liputan6.com, 2016). 
Second, tax avoidance practices cannot be 
identified only based on company characteristics 
(Francis et al., 2012). Considering tax avoidance as 
a politically charged topic (Barford & Holt, 2013), 
several researchers have linked tax avoidance to 
corporate executives' political affiliations. 
Nonetheless, the political connection factor has two 
contradictory impacts: it can assist or create 
nepotism (Adhikari et al., 2006). As a result, there 
are inconsistencies in the previous results. Some 
studies prove that political connection positively 
affects corporate tax aggressiveness (Adhikari et al., 
2006; Wahab et al., 2021). However, other studies 
found that the political connection reduces tax 
avoidance (Ajili & Khlif, 2020; Putra & 
Suhardianto, 2020). The empirical study's ambiguity 
motivates researchers to re-explore the role of the 
board political connection to tax avoidance practices 
and add a moderating variable to this relationship. 
Third, several literature studies show that the 
ownership structure (managerial, institutional, and 
public ownership) influences corporate taxation 
policies. Nonetheless, other empirical studies 
present conflicting research results. In managerial 
ownership context, some studies have proven that 
managerial ownership increasing tax avoidance 
(Boussaidi & Hamed, 2015; Multazam & 
Rahamwaty, 2018), while other studies have found 
that managerial ownership has a negative effect on 
tax avoidance (Pramudito & Sari, 2015; Sunarsih & 
Oktaviani, 2016). Based on the institutional 
ownership perspective, institutional investors 
perform a monitoring process to reduces the 
tendency for aggressive tax behavior (Wahab et al., 
2021; Zemzem & Ftouhi, 2013). On the other hand, 
institutional shareholders want to minimize tax 
payments to increase tax avoidance practices (Chen 
et al., 2019; Huseynov et al., 2017; Khan et al., 
2016). Other findings explain no relationship 
between institutional ownership and taxation 
activities (Jamei, 2017; Sartaji & Hassanzadeh, 
2014). This study examines the role of managerial 
and institutional ownership in the context of tax 
avoidance. 
Fourth, this study also uses public ownership, 
which has not been widely used in previous 
empirical studies. Several findings reveal that public 
shareholders want companies to contribute to 
development through fair tax payments (Puspita & 
Harto, 2014; Schwartz & Duhigg, 2013). Thus, there 
is a negative relationship between public ownership 
and tax avoidance (Chan et al., 2013). However, 
other findings indicate that high public ownership 
increases companies' likelihood of tax avoidance 
(Alexander, 2019; Bauwhede et al., 2003). Contrary 
to these two groups of findings, Iqbal et al. (2020)
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 research failed to prove the relationship between 
public ownership and tax avoidance. This research 
can be a starting point for further research on public 
ownership in public companies' tax evasion practices 
in Indonesia. 
This study aims to prove ownership structures' 
role, namely managerial, institutional, and public 
ownership, as moderating variables between 
political connection and tax avoidance. Corporate 
tax avoidance practices are calculated using the 
Effective Tax Rate (ETR) indicator. The lower ETR 
shows the rate of higher tax avoidance. This study 
uses 119 manufacturing companies on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange for three years of observation. The 
test results show that the political connection has a 
negative effect on ETR. In connection with the 
moderating variable's role, managerialownership 
strengthens the negative relationship between 
political connection and ETR. Meanwhile, 
institutional ownership weakens the negative 
relationship between political connection and ETR. 
Contrary to these two results, public ownership 
cannot moderate the political connection and ETR 
relationship. 
The results contribute to theory and practice. 
Theoretically, these findings contribute to corporate 
tax management literature, mainly political 
connections in tax management strategies. This 
study also provides an understanding of the role of 
ownership structure in tax management. In practice, 
these findings help manufacturing company 
management to understand the impact of ownership 
structure on corporate tax management policies. 
Ownership structure plays a vital part in positioning 
the interests of stakeholders and shareholders.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
development 
Agency theory 
Agency theory discusses a contract between 
agent and principal. This contract aims to regulate 
the rights and obligations between the two parties 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency conflicts begin 
to emerge when appears different interests between 
management and shareholders, such as tax 
avoidance. From an agency perspective, tax 
aggressiveness creates agency conflicts between 
shareholders' interests, management, and possible 
tax risks. The existence of information asymmetry 
between principal and agent increases management 
opportunities to do tax avoidance. In this case, 
effective corporate governance is needed to monitor 
management performance. From a tax-avoidance 
perspective, corporate governance plays a role in 
aligning stakeholders' interests in optimizing 
company performance, primarily to streamline 
corporate tax payments (Kovermann & Velte, 2019). 
 
Political connection and tax avoidance 
Tax avoidance is an act of tax planning by 
taking advantage of existing regulatory weaknesses 
(Wang et al., 2020). The board of directors has a 
central role in managing company resources, 
including selecting an efficient tax management 
strategy to minimize taxable income (Frank et al., 
2009; Wahab et al., 2017). This strategy requires the 
board of directors to manage taxes or take advantage 
of tax authorities' affiliations (Taylor & Richardson, 
2014).  
Five conditions explain that the board of 
directors with political connections tends to practice 
more aggressive tax management (Kim & Zhang, 
2016). First, companies with political connections 
are usually protected by politicians to have a lower 
risk of tax audit detection and avoid future litigation 
risks (Ajili & Khlif, 2020). Second, the company's 
ability to access information regarding 
implementing future tax regulations allows 
companies to implement tax strategies (Wahab et al., 
2017). Political connections allow companies to 
obtain information regarding tolerance for 
aggressive tax management (Ajili & Khlif, 2020; 
Faccio, 2016). Third, the market demands little 
transparency of companies with political affiliations. 
As a result, it is difficult for regulators to identify its 
actual financial condition (Christensen et al., 2015). 
Fourth, companies can reduce political costs to 
become tax aggressive (Faccio, 2016). Fifth, a 
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company with political affiliation allows the 
company to take risks, one of which is related to 
aggressive tax management. 
Some literature reveals that boards of directors 
of companies with political affiliations tend to 
engage in higher tax evasion activity. Managers are 
not burdened with strict regulations and have a 
higher chance of avoiding tax control (Habib et al., 
2017). This condition creates opportunities for 
companies to minimize tax payments. Political 
affiliation also reduces the risk of companies being 
exposed by the media for tax evasion (Christensen et 
al., 2015). If these actions are detected, politically 
connected companies are also likely to avoid harsh 
penalties (Li et al., 2016). Political affiliation causes 
tax authorities not to enforce tax compliance 
effectively (Lin et al., 2018). Therefore, companies 
that are connected politically tend to adopt a more 
aggressive tax strategy (Kim & Zhang, 2016; Wahab 
et al., 2017), as well as making tax payments that are 
much lower than other companies (Adhikari et al., 
2006; Taylor & Richardson, 2014). Thus, the 
following hypothesis is formulated: 
Ha1: Political connection has a negative effect on the 
ETR. 
 
Political connection, managerial ownership, and 
tax avoidance 
Managerial ownership is share ownership by 
internal company parties who actively make 
company business decisions, such as the board of 
commissioners and directors. A literature review 
shows that managerial ownership plays a role in 
positioning management and shareholders' interests 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, it is the fact 
that management's interests often dominate, thus 
creating agency problems. The existence of share 
ownership by board members, directors, and 
commissioners encourages them to protect their 
financial interests (Boussaidi & Hamed, 2015). As a 
result, management can make decisions that 
optimize their benefits (Gotti et al., 2012), mainly in 
tax avoidance practices. 
Studies about managerial ownership and tax 
avoidance still show conflicting findings. The 
empirical study found that managerial ownership 
significantly affects corporate tax aggressiveness 
(Multazam & Rahamwaty, 2018). Managerial 
ownership has also positively correlated with the 
effective tax rate (Boussaidi & Hamed, 2015). Other 
findings reveal that managerial ownership 
decreasing tax avoidance (Pramudito & Sari, 2015). 
This condition indicates that management's share 
ownership can increase optimal supervision and 
influence tax avoidance policies (Sunarsih & 
Oktaviani, 2016). Contrary to previous studies, other 
researchers have failed to prove a relationship 
between managerial ownership and tax avoidance 
(Jamei, 2017; Tijjani & Peter, 2020). This study 
assumes that managerial ownership becomes a 
strong incentive for management to make decisions 
that maximize the company's wealth, including their 
wealth. Management has the authority and 
opportunity to make decisions that benefit 
themselves (Mustapha & Ahmad, 2011). The 
hypothesis formulated is: 
Ha2: Managerial ownership strengthens the negative 
relationship between political connections and ETR. 
 
Political connection, institutional ownership, and 
tax avoidance 
Institutional ownership is one of the 
organizational governance elements that oversee its 
operational activities (Kovermann & Velte, 2019). 
The large volume of shareholding motivates 
institutional investors to monitor management 
actions. Institutional shareholders are seen to 
exercise optimal control over management actions, 
particularly those related to tax avoidance (Ying et 
al., 2015). Institutional investors also have the power 
to discipline managers by preventing tax planning 
activities. Other studies also reveal that institutional 
ownership significantly reduces the effective tax 
rate. The greater the institutional ownership, the tax 
policy is less aggressive (Wahab et al., 2021; 
Zemzem & Ftouhi, 2013). Other studies have failed 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
 
to prove a relationship between institutional 
ownership and tax evasion (Tijjani & Peter, 2020). 
This study predicts that institutional ownership 
reduces the positive effect of political connections 
on tax avoidance. Institutional shareholders have 
large shareholdings. This characteristic focuses them 
on achieving long-term-oriented performance 
(Khurana & Moser, 2012). Also, shareholders are 
concerned about the impact of tax avoidance 
practices on the company's reputation, mainly if 
detected by the tax authorities (Hanlon & Heitzman, 
2010). Tax avoidance detected by tax authorities 
results in various risks, such as increasing tax 
obligations, paying fines, and even damaging the 
company's reputation (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). 
Researchers assume that institutional shareholders 
as the principal prefer to avoid the risks posed by tax 
avoidance. Thus, institutional shareholders' 
involvement in monitoring activities reduce the 
influence of political connections on tax avoidance: 
Ha3: Institutional ownership weakens the negative 
relationship between political connection and ETR. 
 
Political connection, public ownership. and tax 
avoidance 
Public ownership is the shares owned by public 
investors, both individual and institutional (Michel 
et al., 2014). In the tax avoidance context, there are 
two conflicting views regarding the role of public 
ownership. First, public ownership represents the 
community's interests as one of its stakeholders. This 
ownership expects the company to contribute to 
development by paying taxes. The greater the public 
ownership, the lower the tax avoidance (Puspita & 
Harto, 2014). Thus, there is a negative relationship 
between public ownership and tax avoidance (Chan 
et al., 2013).  
Contrary to this view, another view argues that 
high public ownership increases companies' tax 
avoidance (Abdullah et al., 2019). The community 
has expectations of its future cash flows that increase 
its market value (Bauwhede et al., 2003; Shevlin et 
al., 2013). The community may allow companies to 
implement tax planning strategies without violating 
legal provisions (Alexander, 2019) and does not 
damage the company's reputation (Christensen et al., 
2015). As a result, public ownership motivates 
company management to manage revenue 
opportunistically (Bauwhede et al., 2003). 
In the relationship between political connection 
and tax avoidance, it is predicted that public 
ownership reduces the influence of political 
connection on tax avoidance. When a company 
shares ownership with the public, the company must 
implement public accountability (Khan et al., 2016). 
High public ownership increases stakeholder 
pressure for companies to carry out financial 
management transparently and accountable, 
including paying taxes. If companies practice tax 
avoidance, this action can trigger public anger and 
assume that it does not contribute to the state 
(Schwartz & Duhigg, 2013).  
Also, tax avoidance practices can increase 
corporate risk (Scholes et al., 2014). Thus, there is a 
negative relationship between public ownership and 
tax avoidance (Chan et al., 2013). This study predicts 
that public ownership reduces the positive effect of 
political connection and tax avoidance. Thus, the 
hypothesis formulated is: 
Ha4: Public ownership weakens the negative 
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3. Research method 
Population and sample 
The research population is all manufacturing 
companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. This 
study used a purposive sampling method with the 
following criteria: a) registered manufacturing 
companies for 2017-2019; b) the company's annual 
report is accessible; c) the company has the data 
needed; d) the data is normally distributed. Based on 
these criteria, there were 119 company samples or 
357 observational data for the three years. 
 
Measurement of research variables 
This study uses a political connection as an 
independent variable. Political connection is a 
condition that indicates a political relationship 
between the directors or commissioners and external 
parties in the company, in which both parties benefit 
from the political relationship. The criteria used to 
identify the occurrence of political relations are if the 
board of directors or board of commissioners is: 1) a 
member of the people's representative council, 
member of the executive, or an official in a 
government institution, member of the military, or a 
political party; 2) former members of the people's 
representative assembly, former members of the 
executive branch, or former officials in government 
institutions, former members of the military, or 
former members of political parties (Antonius & 
Tampubolon, 2019; Supatmi et al., 2019). The 
measurement uses a dummy variable, namely the 
board of directors with a political connection, code 
1, and code 0 if otherwise.  
This study's dependent variable is tax 
avoidance, which is defined as a company activity 
aiming to reduce corporate tax payments (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010). The indicator used the Effective 
Tax Rate (ETR). ETR is seen as the correct 
measurement because it can detect indications of tax 
deductions through loopholes in the applicable 
legislation and tax shelters (Dyreng et al., 2017). 
ETR is calculated by dividing the company's income 
tax expense with profit before tax (Gaaya et al., 
2019; Tijjani & Peter, 2020). ETR measurement 
results have the opposite function of tax avoidance 
(Gaaya et al., 2019). A higher ETR value indicates 
lower tax avoidance behavior and vice versa (Frank 
et al., 2009). 
The moderating variable is ownership structure, 
consisting of managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership, and public ownership. Managerial 
ownership is share ownership owned by the 
company's board of directors or commissioners 
(Berke-Berga et al., 2017). The measurement of 
managerial ownership is carried out using dummy 
variables because of the limited number of 
companies with this type of ownership. Using the 
percentage of shares as a measurement indicator will 
result in many companies not meeting the specified 
criteria. If the directors and commissioners have 
share ownership, then the value is given 1, and vice 
versa. Institutional ownership implies the percentage 
of shares owned by institutional investors, such as 
banks, insurance companies, or investment 
companies. The measurement of this variable uses 
the percentage of shares owned by institutional 
investors compared to its total number in circulation 
(Tijjani & Peter, 2020). Public ownership is share 
ownership by public investors (society). This 
variable is measured using the percentage of shares 
owned by the public compared to its total number of 
shares in circulation (Michel et al., 2014). 
This study uses two control variables, namely 
company size and leverage. Larger companies tend 
to be more involved in tax avoidance than smaller 
companies (Gaaya et al., 2019; Lin et al., 2014; 
Richardson et al., 2013). However, other empirical 
studies suggest that large companies have less 
aggressive tax behavior to maintain their reputation 
(Gaaya et al., 2019; Richardson et al., 2015). 
Therefore, this study controls for the role of size in 
corporate tax avoidance behavior. The firm size 
variable is measured using the natural logarithm of 
total assets (Gaaya et al., 2019). The second control 
variable is leverage. Previous empirical studies 
revealed a positive relationship between leverage 
and tax avoidance (Badertscher et al., 2013; 
Richardson et al., 2015). In this study, the level of 
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corporate leverage is measured using the debt to 
equity ratio, as tested in previous studies (Tijjani & 
Peter, 2020). 
 
Technical data analysis 
This study examines the ownership structure's 
role, namely managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership, and public ownership. The ownership is 
a moderating variable in the relationship between 
political connection and tax avoidance. The data 
analysis tool used to test the research hypothesis is 
moderated regression analysis. The statistical model 
is formulated in the following equation: 
 
Equation Model 1: 
TA=β0+β1PC+β2FirmSize+β3Lev+e….(1) 
Equation Model 2: 
TA=β0+β1PC+β2MO+β3IO+β4PO+β5PC*MO+β6
PC*IO+β7PC*PO+β7Firm_Size+β8Lev+e …… (2) 
Where: 
TA = Tax avoidance 
β0 = Constant 
β1- β7 = Regression coefficient 
PC = Political connection 
MO = Managerial ownership 
IO = Institutional ownership 
PO = Public ownership 
PC* MO = The interaction between political                                
  connection and managerial 
ownership 
PC*IO = The interaction between political    
connection and institutional 
ownership 
PC*PO =  The interaction between political 
connections and public ownership 
Firm_Size = Firm size 
Lev = Leverage 
e = Error 
 
4. Result and discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows that the political connection 
variable has an average of 0.27. This figure reflects 
that the board political connection has a low value, 
which is only 27.00%. Managerial ownership 
variables also show a low mean value, namely 0.19 
(19.00%). Contrary to managerial ownership, the 
institutional ownership variable has a relatively high 
mean value of 63.24%. Meanwhile, the average size 
of public ownership is 24.17%. The tax avoidance 
variable proxied by ETR has an average value of 
0.19 (19.00%). 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 





357 .00 1.00 .27 .44 
Managerial 
ownership 
357 .00 1.00 .19 .40 
Institutional 
ownership 
357 10.41 99.21 63.24 21.69 
Public 
ownership 
357 .79 70.60 24.17 14.34 
Effective 
tax rate 
357 -.33 .59 .19 .15 
Firm size 357 11.17 29.11 14.97 4.43 
Leverage 357 -6.58 9.85 2.77 2.21 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
357     
Source: Statistic test output (2021) 
Compared to the statutory tax rate in 2017-2019 
of 25.00%, corporate tax payments are lower than 
the corporate tax rate applicable in Indonesia. This 
figure indicates that there is tax avoidance in 
manufacturing companies in Indonesia. Meanwhile, 
firm size and leverage variables have an average of 
14.97 and 2.77.  
 
Hypothesis test results 
This study conducted a classical assumption 
test, namely normality, multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation. This study 
excluded nine companies that had outlier data. 
Furthermore, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed 
that all observed data were normally distributed (α> 
0.05). Relates to the multicollinearity test, the results 
show a tolerance value of more than 0.1 and a VIF 
value of less than 10. Thus, there is no 
multicollinearity in the regression model. 
Heteroscedasticity testing was carried out using the 
Glejser test. The test results show that all 
independent variables have a significance above 
0.05 or no heteroscedasticity. The autocorrelation 
test results showed that the Durbin-Watson value 
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was 1,894, with a du value of 1,863 and a 4-du value 
of 2,137. Thus, there is no autocorrelation. After 
performing the classical assumption test, the next 
test is to test Model 1, presented in Table 2.  
Table 2 shows that the board political 
connection has a negative effect on ETR. The 
political connection indicates the negative 
coefficient direction with a significance value of 
0.000. These results indicate that a board of directors 
and commissioners with political connections can 
increase tax avoidance. The lower the ETR value, 
the higher of company tax avoidance. Thus, the test 
results accept the first hypothesis. The next test is to 
test the moderation effect formulated in Model 2, 
presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 2. Model 1 test results 
Variables 
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients 
t Sig Conclusion 
Beta Std.Error Beta 
(Constant) 27.883 2.457  11.348 .000  
PC -24.330 1.337 -.697 -18.201 .000 Ha1 is supported 
Firm Size -.001 .001 -.019 -.482 .630  
Leverage -.003 .003 -.050 -1.257 .210  
R .698   
R Square .487   
Adjusted R Square .483   
F significant value .000   
Variable dependent: ETR 
Source: statistics output (2021) 
Table 3 presents the interaction test results for 
the three ownership structure types: managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, and public 
ownership. The statistical test results present an 
Adjusted R Square value of 51.10%. This figure 
indicates that the independent and moderating 
variable influencing the tax evasion variable is 
51.10%. Other factors influence the remaining 
48.9%. Furthermore, this study identified the types 
of moderating variables, shown in Table 4. Table 4 
shows that the interaction test results for the political 
connection and managerial ownership variable on 
ETR have a negative coefficient and a significance 
value of 0.038. 




Coefficients t Sig 
B Std.Error Beta 
(Constant) 30.431 3.936  7.732 .000 
PC -47.561 9.108 -1.362 -5.222 .000 
MO -1.910 2.045 -.049 -1.969 .049 
IO .000 .000 -.035 -.674 .501 
PO -.001 .001 -.097 -.934 .351 
PC_MO -4.269 3.506 -.073 -2.148 .038 
PC_IO .003 .001 .508 2.644 .009 
PC_PO .003 .001 .278 1.217 .224 
Firm Size .000 .001 .013 .324 .746 
Leverage -.003 .003 -.043 -1.080 .281 
R .724 Adjusted R Square .511 
R Square .524 F significant value .000 
Variable dependent: ETR 
Source: statistics output (2021) 
Where: 
ETR = Effective tax rate 
PC      = Political connection 
MO = Managerial ownership 
 
IO = Institutional ownership 
PO = Public ownership 
Firm_Size = Firm size 
Lev = Leverage 
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The results imply that managerial ownership 
strengthens the negative relationship between 
political connection and ETR. Testing the 
managerial ownership moderation variable shows 
that this variable can significantly affect the ETR, 
both alone (α = 0.049) and interacting with the 
political connection variable (α = 0.038). This result 
implies that this variable has a dual role, namely, an 
explanatory/predictor variable and a moderating 
variable. Therefore, managerial ownership is a 
quasi-moderation variable (Solimun et al., 2017). 
Thus, the results support the second hypothesis. 
Testing the interaction variables of political 
connection and institutional ownership on ETR has 
a positive coefficient direction and a significance 
value of 0.009. This statistical result means that 
institutional ownership weakens the political 
connection's negative influence and the ETR. The 
results also confirm that institutional ownership acts 
as pure moderation. The independent test results 
show that institutional ownership does not 
significantly affect ETR (α = 0.501). The interaction 
between institutional ownership and political 
connection variables affects the ETR (α = 0.009). 
Therefore, institutional ownership cannot be a 
predictor or explanatory variable, only as a 
moderating variable. In this research model, the 
institutional ownership variable acts as pure 
moderation (Solimun et al., 2017). Thus, these 
findings are consistent with the third hypothesis. 
The interaction test results between the political 
connection and public ownership variables on the 
ETR reveal an insignificant statistical number, 
which is 0.224. This empirical finding proves that 
public ownership variables do not affect ETR, both 
alone (α = 0.351) and interacting with political 
connections (α = 0.224). In this case, the public 
ownership variable does not act as an predictor 
variable or moderating variable. Public ownership 
variables only have the potential as moderating 
variables, both theoretically and empirically. 
Therefore, public ownership is a potential 
moderation or homologous moderation (Solimun et 
al., 2017). Thus, these statistical results do not 
support the fourth hypothesis. 





coefficients t Sig Remark 
Moderation 
Type 
B Std.Error Beta 




MO → ETR -1.910 2.045 -.049 -1.969 .049 
PC*MO → ETR -4.269 3.506 -.073 -2.148 .038 
PC → ETR -47.561 9.108 -1.362 -5.222 .000 
Ha3 Accepted Pure Moderation IO → ETR .000 .000 -.035 -.674 .501 
PC*IO → ETR .003 .001 .508 2.644 .009 





PO → ETR -.001 .001 -.097 -.934 .351 
PC*PO → ETR .003 .001 .278 1.217 .224 
Source:  Statistic output (2021) 
This study also controls for firm size and leverage 
factors that are considered to influence tax avoidance 
practices. The test results in Table 4.3 show that the 
firm size variable has a significance value greater 
than 0.05, namely 0.746 and 0.281. Thus, these two 
variables do not affect corporate tax avoidance.  
Political connection and  tax  avoidance 
Based on the testing of the first hypothesis 
result, the political connection board is proven to 
have a negative effect on ETR. This figure indicates 
that directors and commissioners with political 
connections increase tax avoidance practices. The 
lower ETR value implies that companies tend to do 
tax avoidance. Companies with political affiliations 
generally lack transparency in managing the 
company (Kim & Zhang, 2016). It is not uncommon 
for these companies to receive guarantees or 
preferential treatment from the government (Faccio, 
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2016). The existence of political connections will 
protect company management from the risk of 
litigation in the future Management experience in the 
political realm also influences its strategy in 
managing its tax payments (Putra & Suhardianto, 
2020). Politically connected board members will 
take advantage of this condition to benefit from tax 
avoidance (Zhang et al., 2017). Company boards 
affiliated with tax regulators also have a low risk of 
tax detection (Kim & Zhang, 2016). Another 
advantage is that companies have a network to 
access tax regulations and law enforcement efforts 
(Ajili & Khlif, 2020). Previous empirical findings 
prove that companies have higher tax avoidance 
behavior when politically affiliated with tax 
regulators (Taylor & Richardson, 2014). Boards of 
directors with political connections with tax 
authorities tend to reduce tax compliance 
enforcement efforts (Lin et al., 2018). As a result, 
companies with political affiliation have lower tax 
payment effectiveness than companies without 
political affiliation (Adhikari et al., 2006; Kim & 
Zhang, 2016; Wahab et al., 2017).  
 
Political connection,  managerial ownership, and  
tax avoidance 
The second hypothesis testing results show that 
managerial ownership strengthens the negative 
relationship between the political and effective tax 
rates. These statistics indicate that share ownership 
by the company's internal parties also determines 
strategic decisions and company performance 
(Multazam & Rahamwaty, 2018). Managerial 
ownership encourages management to save their 
company's financial interests (Boussaidi & Hamed, 
2015). In this case, managerial ownership aligns the 
interests of principals and agents and the company's 
interests with themselves. Management's self-
interest often dominates in the company. As a result, 
managers tend to make corporate strategic decisions 
that optimize their benefits (Gotti et al., 2012), one 
of which is corporate tax management. The greater 
the percentage of shares owned by the company 
board, the greater the board's potential to make 
decisions that can maximize their wealth as 
shareholders (Kamardin, 2014). 
In the context of taxation, managerial ownership 
can align the company's interests to make tax savings 
with the interests of management to improve the 
company's cash position. This study's results note 
that the percentage of managerial ownership in the 
sample companies is relatively small. Chen and Yu's 
(2012) findings reveal that when management has a 
minor shareholding in the company, its 
dysfunctional behavior increases. Management has 
an incentive to falsify disclosure of financial 
statements because reported earnings will form the 
basis for determining the manager's remuneration. It 
is also the case with corporate tax management 
policies. Managerial share ownership provides an 
opportunity for company managerial parties with 
political connections to make financial decisions that 
benefit the company and the management itself. The 
company board considers that tax avoidance 
measures will save the company's cash, using other 
operational activities. Thus, managerial ownership 
strengthens the negative relationship between the 
board political connection and ETR. 
 
Political connection, institutional ownership, and 
tax avoidance 
Testing the third hypothesis proves that 
institutional ownership weakens the negative 
relationship between political connection and 
effective tax rate. Institutional shareholders 
generally have high share ownership. In this study, 
the average institutional share ownership is 63.24% 
which indicates high ownership. In this case, 
institutional share ownership does not only minimize 
agency conflicts between principal and agent 
(Wahab et al., 2021). Institutional investors have a 
strong incentive to monitor management 
performance. Institutional shareholders discipline 
and motivate managers to maximize firm value in 
the long term by preventing tax planning activities 
(Tijjani & Peter, 2020).  
Institutional ownership also influences the 
company's management strategy (Minnick & Noga, 
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2010). Institutional shareholders' presence improves 
the monitoring function, particularly in fulfilling 
corporate tax obligations and responsibilities as 
good citizens (Wahab et al., 2021) conducted by 
institutional investors will increase as their holdings 
increase (Ying et al., 2015). Institutional ownership 
can require politically affiliated companies to 
properly carry out tax obligations not to lose political 
benefits or gains (Christensen et al., 2015; Mills et 
al., 2012). Given that tax avoidance activities 
increase the company's potential and risk exposure 
(Scholes et al., 2014), institutional investors tend to 
avoid tax aggressive behavior (Wahab et al., 2021; 
Zemzem & Ftouhi, 2013). Shareholders focus more 
on the impact of tax avoidance practices on company 
reputation (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). High 
institutional shareholders' presence encourages 
companies to increase company loyalty to the 
government through tax payments (Putra & 
Suhardianto, 2020). The supervision process by 
institutional ownership intensively can mitigate 
political connections on tax aggressiveness. Thus, 
institutional investors can reduce the negative effect 
of the board political connection on corporate tax 
aggressive behavior.  
 
Political connection, public ownership, and tax 
avoidance 
The fourth hypothesis's statistical testing results 
show that public ownership variables do not affect 
the relationship between political connection and 
effective tax rate. Previous research has found two 
different views regarding the role of public 
ownership in tax avoidance. The first view states that 
public ownership represents the interests of society. 
Generally, people expect companies to contribute to 
the state through tax payments (Chan et al., 2013; 
Puspita & Harto, 2014). However, another view 
argues that high public ownership increases 
companies' likelihood of tax avoidance (Abdullah et 
al., 2019). This condition is motivated by high public 
expectations of future cash flows to increase its 
market value (Shevlin et al., 2013). Companies can 
implement tax planning strategies as long as they do 
not violate legal provisions (Alexander, 2019).  
However, the results contradict the previous 
result. This study failed to prove that public 
ownership reduces the negative effect of the board 
political connection on tax avoidance. This condition 
is because public ownership does not substantially 
influence corporate strategic decisions, particularly 
in the corporate tax management strategy. In this 
study, the average number of public ownership was 
24.17%. This figure indicates that the community 
has not played a significant role in the supervisory 
function of management decision-making. Also, 
communities may not focus on corporate tax 
management strategies and ignore corporate tax 
avoidance practices. The public is generally more 
concerned with the profit that the company receives 
to increase its shares' market value. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Tax avoidance practice is a complex 
phenomenon because it involves corporate boards 
and shareholders. The presence of company boards 
with political connections is considered in choosing 
a tax management strategy. Also, tax management 
policies must consider the ownership structure to 
align company management and stakeholders' 
interests. This study aims to identify ownership 
structures' role, namely managerial, institutional, 
and public ownership, as moderating variables in the 
relationship between board political connection and 
tax avoidance. Corporate tax avoidance practices are 
calculated using the ETR indicator. The lower the 
ETR value, the higher the company tax avoidance. 
The test results reveal that the political connection 
lowers the ETR value and indicates high tax 
avoidance. This finding also confirms that political 
connections within the company are not merely a 
provision of assistance but also creates nepotism. 
Therefore, the process of political lobbying by 
corporate boards reduce the company's tax burden. 
The presence of managerial ownership also 
strengthens the negative influence of political 
connections on ETR. Thus, managerial ownership is 
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a quasi-moderation variable. However, institutional 
ownership weakens the negative influence of 
political connection on ETR. In this study, the 
institutional ownership variable acts as pure 
moderation. Contrary to the two previous 
moderation tests, public ownership could not 
moderate the political connection and ETR 
relationship. Thus, public ownership only has the 
potential as a moderating variable known as 
homologous moderation.  
Theoretically, this study's results imply that this 
study's results support Agency Theory, which 
emphasizes the importance of good governance in 
reducing the potential for agency conflicts. In this 
study, ownership structure, mainly external 
ownership, effectively reduces management's 
opportunistic behavior in tax avoidance practices. 
Practically, this finding implies that tax management 
strategy is determined by the company's board but 
must consider external parties, such as institutional 
and public shareholders. These results also 
underscore that manufacturing companies have a 
good reputation as Indonesia's most significant tax 
contributor. Therefore, companies should avoid tax 
avoidance practices. Concerning increasing tax 
revenues, tax authorities must have high competence 
and accurate information to detect the manipulate 
financial data. Also, the tax authority must strictly 
monitor the practices of the company's transfer 
pricing. 
This study is inseparable from various 
limitations. The first limitation is that this study 
cannot show the average percentage of managerial 
ownership in the sample companies. In this study, 
managerial ownership is measured using a dummy 
variable because only a few sample companies have 
this type of ownership. If the following research is to 
test the fundamental managerial ownership role, the 
researcher can use the percentage to measure 
managerial ownership. The second limitation is the 
Adjusted R Square value of 51.10%. This figure 
indicates that other factors influence 48.9%. 
Therefore, future research can examine other 
governance elements, such as the audit committee or 
the external auditor. 
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